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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alex Stewart appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to
the terms of his conditional plea agreement.

Specifically, he reserved the right to

appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion. The district court sentenced
him to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
Mr. Stewart subsequently completed the period of retained jurisdiction and the district
court suspended his sentence for a period of probation.
Mr. Stewart contends on appeal that the district court erroneously determined
that a tip from a confidential informant (hereinafter, Cl) gave the officers reasonable
suspicion to initiate a Terry 1 stop on his vehicle. Because the information provided to
officers by the Cl was not specific, consisted of mainly the Cl's beliefs, and was based
on hearsay statements of undisclosed declarants, the information was not reliable and
did not give the officers reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Stewart and his co-defendant,
Daniel Widner. 2 Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying
Mr. Stewart's motion.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Mr. Stewart understands that Mr. Widner also entered a conditional guilty plea
preserving the same issue for appeal, and that he has appealed to the Supreme
Court in accordance with the terms of that plea in Docket Number 39908. It is also
Mr. Stewart's understanding that Mr. Widner has recently filed his own appellant's brief
in that case.
1
1

2

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Ryan Malenese pulled over Mr. Stewart's vehicle claiming it had failed to
signal at two different times.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.13, Ls.12-13.)3

When Officer Malenese

approached the window of the vehicle, he was able to detect the odor of marijuana
coming from the vehicle. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.32, L.18 - p.33, L.2.) This ultimately
led to a search of the vehicle and the boxes found within. (See generally R., pp.51-56)
Inside the boxes, officers found 2.9 pounds of marijuana. (R., p.70.)
Mr. Stewart initially challenged the stop based on Officer Malenese's articulated
reason for the stop, asserting that there was no requirement for him to signal at either
location identified by Officer Malenese. 4 (R., pp.36-48.) The district court ultimately
agreed with Mr. Stewart, finding there was no obligation to signal at either location, and
thus, no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop in that regard.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.115,

Ls.1-12 (finding no requirement to signal where the road, though bending to the right,
did not stop, but rather, constituted the continuing road of a 'T' intersection); Tr., Vol.2,
p.118, L.14 - p.119, L.15) (finding no requirement to signal where the road widened
from one lane into two); Tr., Vol.3, p.9, Ls.11-21 (reaffirming that ruling after viewing a
video submitted by the state).)

The State, however, argued that the officers gained

3

The transcripts in this case are provided in several independently bound and
paginated volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the
transcripts of the motion hearing held on September 13, 201-1, as well as the transcript
form the sentencing hearing held on March 19, 2012. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume
containing the continued transcript of the motion hearing held on October 11, 2011.
"Vol.3" will refer to the volume containing the final part of the motion hearing, held on
October 27, 2011. "Vol.4" will refer to the volume containing the change of plea hearing
held on December 19, 2011."
4 Mr. Stewart's motion was captioned as "Motion in Limine." (R., p.36.) As the relief
requested was "excluding all evidence obtained in this manner" it is referred to
throughout the brief as a motion to suppress. (See generallyTrs.)
2

reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on information received from a Cl.
(R., pp.119-31.)

Officer Chris Jessup was the officer who talked with the Cl. (See Jessup Report,
dated February 1, 2011, attached to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI).) He testified as to his interactions with the Cl during the hearings on Mr. Stewart's
motion in limine. (See generally Tr., Vol.3.) According to Officer Jessup, the informant
began providing officers with information pursuant to an agreement with the State, and
in exchange, the State agreed not to prosecute him/her for delivery of a controlled
substance. (Tr., Vol.3, p.18, Ls.7-8.) That agreement was subject to termination if the
Cl provided officers with bad information.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.21, Ls.4-12.) Officer Jessup

testified that this informant had four prior successful tips to his credit, including two
controlled drug buys from Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.18, L.16 - p.19, L.18.) There was
no indication that the Cl had any such interactions with Mr. Stewart. (See generally Tr.,
Vol.3.)

Officer Jessup described several calls he had with this Cl in regard to this

particular case.
First, the Cl contacted Officer Jessup on January 11, 2011, telling him that
he/she believed Mr. Widner would be traveling to California on one of the next two
weekends (January 14 or January 21, 2011) to buy more marijuana. (Tr., Vol.3, p.21,
L.21 - p.22, L.4.) The officer did not testify as to any basis provided by the Cl to support
that belief.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.21, L.21 - p.22, L.11.) Mr. Widner did not, to the officer's

knowledge, make such a run on either of those dates. (Tr., Vol.3, p.40, L.24 - p.41,
L.2.) After not hearing from the Cl for ten days, Officer Jessup initiated contact with the

Cl.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.10-16.)

Again, the Cl told the officer that he/she believed

Mr. Widner would be making a run for more marijuana based on the fact that the Cl had
3

not had contact with Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.17-24.) The Cl followed up later
that day, informing the officer that Mr. Widner had not left, but was "going to be
travelling to California." (Tr., Vol.3, p.23, Ls.7-10.)
Officer Jessup contacted the Cl again on January 26, 2011, and the Cl said
he/she believed Mr. Widner was going to be making a run that weekend, again based
on the fact that the Cl had not had contact with Mr. Widner for several days, the Cl had
not spoken with Mr. Widner in several days. (Tr., Vol.3, p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.15.) "The
informant eventually told [Officer Jessup] that he or she had learned that Mr. Widner
was going to be travelling to California on that weekend." (Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.13-15.)
Officer Jessup subsequently contacted the Cl on January 29, 2011, and the Cl said that
he/she believed Mr. Widner had left town, again based on the fact that he/she had not
had contact with Mr. Widner.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.25, Ls.2-4.) Officer Jessup attempted to

corroborate this information, but observed Mr. Widner's cars parked at his house
throughout the day. (Tr., Vol.3, p.26, Ls.5-13.) As a result, the officer contacted the Cl
again, who told Officer Jessup he/she would ask around for more information. (Jessup
Report, dated February 1, 2011, p.2; see Tr., Vol.3, p.28, L.17 - p.29, L.2.) The Cl
called the officer back and told him only that Mr. Widner had gone with his roommate,
Mr. Stewart, and they had taken Mr. Stewart's car. (Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.7-11.) The Cl
did not provide any information about the car; rather, Officer Jessup relied on his own
knowledge about Mr. Stewart's car. 5 (Tr., Vol.3, p.54, Ls.5-13.) Officer Jessup did not
remember seeing the car of which he was thinking at Mr. Stewart's and Mr. Widner's

5

At the hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Jessup did not testify about any
basis the Cl had given for this information. (See generally Tr., Vol.3.) However, his
report indicated that the Cl had received this information from an individual whose name
had been blacked out of the report. (Jessup Report, dated February 1, 2011.)
4

residence from his previous surveillance.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.3-12.) There was no

information presented about the route the car was going to take. (See generally Tr.,
Vol.3.)
Nevertheless, based on that information, Officer Jessup arranged a surveillance
operation with his partner, Sergeant Griggs, to try and stop Mr. Stewart's car as it
returned to Mountain Home. (Tr., Vol.3, p.54, L.23 - p.55, L.6.) The officers informed
Sergeant Bradshaw, the shift commander, of their plan. (Tr., Vol.3, p.30, Ls.7-12.) That
information was subsequently passed onto Officer Malenese when he came on duty.
(Tr., Vol.3, p. 70, Ls.6-12.) Officer Malenese testified he received specific instructions in
regard to that information: "I was told ... [i]f we were able to develop our own probable
cause to stop the vehicle, then [the narcotics officers] would come and assist with the
stop. If we couldn't develop our own probable cause [we were] to radio over to them
as we were behind the suspect vehicle, and they would advise us what to do at that
point" (Tr., Vol.3, p.73, L.21 - p.74, L.4.) As such, when Officer Malenese identified
Mr. Stewart's car, he tried to justify his traffic stop based on the failure to signal. (See
Tr., Vol.3, p.72, Ls.17-25.)
The district court ultimately determined that the informant had been able to give
reliable information regarding the date of the trip and which car was being used, which
was corroborated by the officers.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.95, L.24 - p.96, L.7.)

As such, the

district court found reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry stop on the vehicle.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.97, L.16 - p.98, L.18.)

Mr. Stewart timely appealed his conviction

challenging that decision pursuant to his conditional plea agreement. (R., pp.203-05.)

5

ISSUE
Whether the information provided by the Cl was insufficient to give the officers
reasonable suspicion to justify their warrantless seizure of Mr. Stewart's vehicle.

6

ARGUMENT
The Information Provided By The Cl Was Insufficient To Give The Officers Reasonable
Suspicion To Justify Their Warrantless Seizure Of Mr. Stewart's Vehicle

A.

Introduction
When a Cl provides an officer with a tip, that tip must be reviewed for its

reliability.

If it is not reliable, it cannot justify the officer's warrantless seizure of the

suspect.

In this case, the Cl's information, when considered in the totality of the

circumstances, was not reliable, and therefore, cannot justify the officers' warrantless
seizure of Mr. Stewart's vehicle. As such, this Court should reverse the district court's
order denying Mr. Stewart's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during that
illegal seizure.

8.

The Cl's Information In Regard To This Particular Case Was Not Reliable, As It
Consisted Primarily Of The Cl's Beliefs And Third Party Hearsay, Rather Than
His/Her Own Observations
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ).
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State
7

demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State
v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I,

§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution).

Officers are allowed to temporarily detain citizens if they possess a reasonable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 30; State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 820 (2004). Officers cannot garner reasonable
suspicion from hunches, instinct, speculation, or lucky guesses.

See, e.g., United

States v. Sako/ow, 490 U.S. 1, 16 (1989), Marshall, J., dissenting, ("For law

enforcement officers to base a search, even in part, on a 'pop' guess ... stretches the
concept of reasonable suspicion beyond recognition .... "); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 811 (2009) ("[R]easonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 'incohate
and unparticularized suspicion."'). Such reasonable suspicion may arise from a reliable
tip provided to officers. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990); Bishop, 146 Idaho
at 812. When the person providing the tip is known to the police, they are presumed to
be reliable. 6

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812.

In Idaho, that presumption of reliability is

rebuttable. Id. The information provided by the Cl is subject to evaluation for reliability
in the totality of the circumstances, and if it is shown to not be reliable, it does not
generate reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless seizure. See id.
One factor that impacts the determination of reliability is the source of the Cl's
information. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812. For example, personal observation of events by
the Cl is a strong indicator of reliable information. State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 66
(Ct. App. 2009).

6

However, when the information is based on a third party's hearsay

The informant in this case is a known informant. (Tr., Vol.3, p.17, Ls.19-20.)
8

statements, the information is less reliable because the declarant's veracity also affects
the reliability of the information. 7 Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813-14; see also United States
v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that an informant's tip that

was based on information that his relative told to the informant did not give rise to
reasonable suspicion because the relative was unidentified and "the police here had no
way of knowing the state of mind of [the informant's] relative when she gave her
information, or whether she was a person who could be relied on to relate events
accurately"). As such, even though the Cl may be presumed reliable, that presumption
does not automatically make hearsay statements in the tip reliable. See Bishop, 146
Idaho at 813-14.
Another factor that impacts this determination is the content of the tip. Bishop,
146 Idaho at 812. For example, the more specific information in the tip, the more likely
it is to be reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1119
(9th Cir. 2003).

Additionally, where the risk that the information is fabricated is

increased, the reliability of that information is decreased. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
275 (2000). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the information provided by the Cl
in this case to determine if it was reliable before it can be determined to justify a
warrantless seizure. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812.
In this case, the Cl provided a series of tips. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.21, L.25 - p.28,
L.11.) Most of those tips provided very little in terms of content, stating only that the Cl
could not get hold of Mr. Widner, and therefore, the Cl believed Mr. Widner was on a

7

This is not to say that reasonable suspicion can never arise from a known informant's
tip which is based on third party hearsay, because it can. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 814.
Rather, the fact that the tip is based on hearsay is one factor that is to be considered in
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the reliability or non-reliability of the
information, and it can affect whether reasonable suspicion arises therefrom. Id.
9

drug run. 8 (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.4; Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.21-24; Tr.
Vol.3, p.25, Ls.2-4.) Furthermore, the information initially provided by the Cl was that
Mr. Widner would be making a run on January 14 or January 21, 2011. (Tr., Vol.3,
p.40, Ls.2-4.) However, there was no evidence that any such trip actually occurred,
meaning the Cl's beliefs, and thus, the tips, were incorrect. 9

(See Tr., Vol.3, p.40,

L.24 - p.41, L.2.)
Officer Jessup called the Cl again on January 29, and the Cl said he/she
believed that Mr. Widner had gone on a drug run and would return on January 30, 2011.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.24, L.16 - p.25, L.4.) Again, this tip was predicated on the fact that the Cl
had been out of contact with Mr. Widner, and it was his/her belief that Mr. Widner was
making a drug run.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.47, Ls.17-20; Tr., Vol.3, p.25, Ls.2-4.)

Officer Jessup decided to attempt to corroborate that information.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.26,

Ls.5-9.) However, his investigation revealed that neither of the vehicles Mr. Widner was
known to drive left Mr. Widner's home that day, and as such, tended to disprove the Cl's
information.

(See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, Ls.10-13.)

The inference form Officer Jessup's

conversation with the Cl following Officer Jessup's attempted corroboration was that the
Cl would try to get more information in that regard. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.14 - p.27,

The fact that the Cl could not get in contact with Mr. Widner may have indicated
nothing more than the battery on Mr. Widner's cell phone had died. It certainly does not
provide an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Subjective intent is not relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); State v. Schwartz, 133 Idaho 463,467 (1999).
9 It is not disputed that this Cl had several tips which were accurate, including two
involving Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.18, L.19 - p.19, L.18.) However, when considered in
the totality of the circumstances, this Cl's information is incorrect at least one-third of the
time (two times out of six known disclosures). Additionally, the prior two incidents
involving Mr. Widner were controlled purchases, which means the Cl was having direct
contact with Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.19, Ls.11-18.) Therefore, they are of less value
in determining the veracity of the information arising from the lack of direct contact with
Mr. Widner.
8
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L.2; Tr., Vol.3, p.50, L.18 - p.51, L.15.) Inherent therein is that the Cl would be speaking
to third parties, as he/she was not able to get in contact with Mr. Widner, who (if the Cl
was correct) was gone. 10 (See Tr., Vol.3, p.47, Ls.17-20; Tr., p.25, Ls.2-4.)
Finally, the information that the Cl subsequently provided regarding Mr. Stewart's
car had no· specifics about the car, which further indicates that the information was
unreliable.

(See Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.7-11; Tr., Vol.3, p.54, Ls.5-13 (Officer Jessup

admitting the Cl did not give him specifics about Mr. Stewart's car, but that he had relied
on his own knowledge of the car). 11 The Cl also did not provide any specific information
about the car's route or destination, beyond "California." (See generally Tr., Vol.3.) The
lack of specifics, when considered in combination with the fact that the only information
was premised on the Cl's beliefs arising from a lack of contact with Mr. Widner,
indicates that this was nothing more than a lucky guess, which does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion. See Sako/ow, 490 U.S. 16, Marshall, J., dissenting; Bishop, 146
Idaho at 811; compare Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d at 1119 (finding that a tip which
provided specific details about the suspect car, as well as specific details about the
route it would take, gave the officers reasonable suspicion). In fact, Officer Malenese

10

While the record does not indicate it was before the district court at the time it ruled
on Mr. Stewart's motion, Officer Jessup's report from February 1, 2011, which detailed
his contact with the Cl, was appended to the PSI. It indicated that the Cl did, in fact, get
his/her subsequent information in this regard from a third party. (Jessup Report dated
February 1, 2011, p.2.) That third party was not identified in the record (in fact, his/her
name was blacked out of the report), nor was his/her veracity questioned. (See
generally R., Tr.) Therefore, the information he/she provided, relayed to officers
through the Cl, is less likely to be reliable. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813-14; see also
J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (where the court is unable to judge the credibility of the source of
the information, the statement is more unreliable, particularly if there is a risk of
fabrication); Monteiro, 447 F.3d at 45-46 (uncorroborated hearsay tips are more likely to
be unreliable).
11 As a result of the officer's reliance on his own knowledge, rather than having the Cl
describe the car, it is not even possible to conclude with certainty that the Cl and the
officer were talking about the same car.
11

was instructed that, unless he was able to identify independent probable cause, he was
not to pull over Mr. Stewart's vehicle, even though the officers had received the tip from
the Cl. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.73, L.21 - p.74, L.4.) Rather, he was supposed to request
further instruction from Officer Jessup or Sergeant Griggs.

(See Tr., Vol.3, p.73,

L.21 - p.74, LA.)
Therefore, even though this Cl was known to the police, the information he/she
provided in this case was not reliable so as to give officers a reasonable suspicion to
seize Mr. Stewart's car. Therefore, the district court's order denying the suppression
motion was in error and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2013.

BRIAN R.
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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